The Weak State Trap

Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo; Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés; Robinson, James A.

doi:10.57784/1992/41137

Publicación:
The Weak State Trap

dc.contributor.author	Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo
dc.contributor.author	Molina Guerra, Carlos Andrés
dc.contributor.author	Robinson, James A.
dc.date.accessioned	2020-07-28T17:16:36Z
dc.date.available	2020-07-28T17:16:36Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.description.abstract	Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.
dc.format.extent	53 páginas
dc.identifier.doi	10.57784/1992/41137
dc.identifier.eissn	1657-7191
dc.identifier.instname	instname:Universidad de los Andes	spa
dc.identifier.issn	1657-5334
dc.identifier.reponame	reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca	spa
dc.identifier.repourl	repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/	spa
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1992/41137
dc.language.iso	spa
dc.provenance.unit	Facultad de Economía
dc.publisher	Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Documentos CEDE No. 25 Julio de 2020
dc.relation.repec	https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/018248.html	spa
dc.rights.accessrights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	spa
dc.rights.coar	http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2	spa
dc.rights.license	Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.	spa
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject.jel	D72, D73, H26, C83, C93
dc.subject.keyword	State capacity
dc.subject.keyword	Tax evasion
dc.subject.keyword	Clientelism
dc.subject.keyword	Vote buying
dc.subject.keyword	Social desirability bias
dc.subject.keyword	list experiments
dc.title	The Weak State Trap
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	spa
dc.type.coar	http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042	spa
dc.type.coarversion	http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa	spa
dc.type.content	Text	spa
dc.type.driver	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper	spa
dc.type.redcol	https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP	spa
dc.type.version	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion	spa
dspace.entity.type	Publication