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Publicación Acceso abierto Cooperativeness and competitiveness in children(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2012) Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Dreber, Anna; Essen, Emma von; Ranehill, EvaCooperation and competition are both essential elements of economic life. Here we explore how cooperativeness in a prisoner's dilemma is correlated with competitiveness in a sample of 9-12 year old children in Colombia and Sweden. Using two different measures and four different tasks for competitiveness, we find no consistent relationship between cooperativeness and competitiveness. However, we find evidence of a negative relationship between willingness to compete in a math task and cooperativeness in the overall sample. Competitiveness in math has previously been related to educational choices, and may therefore be the most economically relevant relationship.Publicación Acceso abierto Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2006) Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos; Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés; Cárdenas Campo, Juan CamiloWe model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.Publicación Acceso abierto Gender and cooperation in children: experiments in Colombia and Sweden(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2012) Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Dreber, Anna; Essen, Emma von; Ranehill, EvaThis paper compares cooperation among Columbian and Swedish children aged 9-12. We illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by children and performed during a physical education class. We find some evidence that children cooperate more in Sweden than in Colombia. Girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys, whereas our results indicate the opposite gender gap in Sweden. On average, children are more cooperative with boys than with girls.Publicación Acceso abierto Social norms and behavior in the local commons through the lens of field experiments(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2009) Cárdenas Campo, Juan CamiloBehavior in the local commons is usually embedded in a context of regulations and social norms that the group of users face. Such norms and rules affect how individuals value material and non-material incentives and therefore determine their decision to cooperate or over extract the resources from the common-pool. This paper discusses the importance of social norms in shaping behavior in the commons through the lens of experiments, and in particular experiments conducted in the field with people that usually face these social dilemmas in their daily life. Through a large sample of experimental sessions with around one thousand people between villagers and students, I test some hypothesis about behavior in the commons when regulations and social norms constrain the choices of people. The results suggest that people evaluate several components of the intrinsic and material motivations in their decision to cooperate. While responding in the expected direction to a imperfectly monitored fine on over extraction, the expected cost of the regulation is not a sufficient explanatory factor for the changes in behavior by the participants in the experiments. Even with zero cost of violations, people can respond positively to an externalPublicación Acceso abierto Cooperation in large networks: an experimental approach(Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, 2007) Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Jaramillo Herrera, Christian RafaelWe present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the players' ability to communicate -and through it, their cooperation levels-, and also their willingness to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have more stable play strategies.